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THE GREAT GALLUP COAL STRIKE OF'1933

HARRY R. RUBENSTEIN

I

N THE I930S labor underwellt a major transition, andexperienced the rise and decline of a nationwide radical union movement.
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in
1933 ushered in a new age of labor relations. Under section 7a of
this act workers were granted the legal right to organize into union,s
of their own choice and bargain collectively with their employers.
Little research has been done on the history of labor in New
Mexico during these turbulent years., There is, however, ample
evidence to suggest that its residents felt the era's effects, as employees throughout the state attempted to form organizations for
their own mutual protection.
Thollgh workers" rights were now sanctioned under this law,
their struggle' to achieve them was far from over. Years of high
unemployment after World War I, followed by the depression,
had adversely affected unionization. With dwindling ,funds the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) drastically reduced, its, organizing efforts and fought a losing battle against wage reductions,
layoffs and declining membership. Internally, factionalism char.:.
acterized the labor movement; Major splits between radicals and
traditionalists led to the establishment of dual unions in numerous
industries. Declining and divided, the labor movement struggled
to take advantage of this much needed concession obtained from
the government, and threw its almost exhausted resources into
a major' drive for mernbership, aiding workers in exercising their
newly obtained rights.
Employers throughout the, country" including New Mexico,
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quickly reacted to the legislation either by fonning company
unions of their own or by simply disregarding the implications
of the law. Labor organizers found themselves still combating the
traditional forces used against them; company guards, state militias
and court action. Additionally, as a result of the NIRA, a new
dimension was added to workers' difficulties. Companies faced
with communist or radical unionists turned to more conservative
labor organizations, offering them limited recognition in order to
avoid the establishment of a more progressive union.
Between 1912 and 1933, union membership in New Mexico
decreased, whereupon the state experienced a new resurgence of
activity. AFL craft unions started to rebuild themselves and
achieved minor victories, most notably the organizing of the
retail clerks in Clovis. Agricultural workers in the northern part
of the state began to unite under the Liga Ohera de Hahla Espanol,
a semi-industrial union that originated in the beet fields of Colorado. In the metal mines the International Union of Mine, Mill
and Smelter Workers established five locals. It was, however, in
the coal mines throughout New Mexico that the greatest strike
activity centered.! The largest of these strikes took place in the
mining community of Gallup. In August 1933, miners struck the
city's five bituminous coal fields, the Gallup American Coal Company, Mutual Coal, Light and Power Company, Diamond Coal
Company, Gallup Southwestern Coal Company and Defiance
Coal Company, for union recognition.
.
Coal companies in the Gallup area, as was true with industry
in general, had suffered from the depression. Nationally, at the
beginning of 1933 producers saw no indications that this condition would improve. In the first three months the industry
reached new lows as the financial crisis of that year deepened.
Though the industry began to recover following the nationwide
bank holiday in March, mines west of the Mississippi continued
their decline. 2
Production at the Gallup mines followed this trend and the unemployed increased their ranks. 3 By August 1933, half of the area's
two thousand miners were out of work,4 while many of those who

RUBENSTEIN: GALLUP COAL STRIKE

were lucky enough to keep their jobs were working a short week.
At the Gallup American Coal Company, the largest mine in the
region, miners worked an average of two or three days a week,
as the company tried to carry as many men as possible through
these hard years. 5
Since 1922, when miners lost a strike organized by the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), grievances had mounted,
and it was only a matter of time until another outbreak of militancy would occur. Complaints were many and varied from mine
to mine, though certain of these were commonly expressed. Miners
protested against racial discrimination suffered by native Chicanos
and aliens from Mexico and eastern Europe. They Wanted their
own grievance committees, overtime pay, increased pay fOf dead~
work (non-mining maintenance work), arid a reduction in penalties for loading dirty coal (coal mixed with rock). Accusations
that the companies had tampered with the mine scales were numerous.
Soon after the NIRA was sig~ed into law, Horace Moses,'manager of Gallup American's Gamerco mine, made plans to organize
a company union. On July 10, 1933, Moses called his employees
together to inform them of his intentions. He noted that in ,the
past managemerit had objected to labor organizations, but that
if miners now chose to form an independent union he would wel~
come it.' He set July 13 as the date for them to meet and elect
officers and grievance committee members.
What had initially been prompted by an act of legislation provided the groundwork fora much needed worker-controlled union.
Nearly all of the mine's 554 workers were present when a temporary'chairinan called the election meeting to order. Immediately
two men' from a nearby mine took the Roor. They convincingly
argued against a company union and suggested that a distriCt union
would 'provide additional advantages of independent strength and
unity. Others supported their argument, pointing out'that the
new recovery act granted them the right to form a union of their
own choosing. The majority accepted this alternative and 'adjourned the meeting. 6
'

176

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW LU:3 1977

Shortly thereafter two "outside agitators," RobertF. Roberts and
his wife Martha, who had been active in the Pecos Valley farm
strike, carne to Gallup at the request of a group of workers to help
in their organizing drive. The Robertses were both graduates of
A. J. Muste's Brookwood Labor College, an institution established
to train progressive labor leaders, and were currently serving as
representatives for the National Miners' Union. 7
The National Miners' Union (NMU), evolved as a reaction
against the growing conservatism of the United Mine Workers
and out of policy changes in the Communist party. UMWA president John L. Lewis had by 1925 gained total controlof the union.
The power to elect organizers had been taken from the rank and
file and handed to Lewis. In that year progressives'and communist
members of the UMWA had formed the Save the Union committee and had been expelled by presidential fiat. One local after
another had been placed under presidential trusteeship, giving
Lewis control of the whole organization and subjecting it to a
one-man dictatorship. Internal conflicts and factionalism continued until opposition forces pulled out of the union. One of
these factions under communist leadership met in the fall of 1928
and formed the National Miners' Union, claiming a membership
of forty thousand. s In 1929 when the Communist party reversed
its position on working within established union structures and
setup the Trade Union Unity League as an alternative labor
federation, the NMU joined as one of its largest members. 9
The fundamental purpose of this new miners' union was to
establish a rank and file organization and to compete directly with
the UMWA for the loyalties of miners in unorganized coal fields:
It called for workers irrespective of race or sex to join, and to
"participate in the struggle for abolishing the capitalistic system
and replace it with socialism."lo
It was in areas such as Gallup that the NMU achieved its
greatest following. The union's strong emphasis on organizing
those subject to racial discrimination· and its stress on militant
action appealed to Gallup miners. When the local coal workers
again met to discuss building a district union,' they decided to
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change their original plans and join one of the two national organizations, either the UMWA or the NMU. In a vote of 451 to 27
the .National Miners won the support of the men .and began' to
take steps to obtain union recognition from the companies. l l
_-Their organizational drive soon met with opposition. The
Gallup city council refused the NMU a permit for a fund-raising
dance on the grounds that they were "un-American and Anarchistic" and linked with the Communist party.12 Though it is questionable whether they were un-American or anarchistic, links did
exist between the NMU and the party.1S Following the refusal
by the city council, the Robertses held a mass meeting, where they
denied charges of communist affiliation; reportedly a thousand
people attended. 14 Though openly calling for socialism and distri~
buting communist literature, NMU organizers, the Robertses and
others, continued to deny any relationship with the party throughout their stay in town. The red scare which followed World War I
had demonstrated to radicals the consequences of being too bold.
The NMU's primary purpose was not to debate the merits of
communism but to establish a union in Gallup, a vehicle through
which the workers could formally voice their grievances~
.' Close to twoweeks after this demonstration the National Miners
were prepared to present a list of demands to coal companies. On
August 26, "miners began circulating grievances to four of the
five mine managers; the Defiance Coal Company was excluded
at this time.' The demands consisted of several points, most importantly, the right to joiri a union, recognition of an independent
miners' committee and checkweighman, a redefinition of dirty
coal with a reduction in penalties, required deadwork to be paid
at company rate, overtime pay, and all powder to be charged to
the men at cost price. The union offered mine owners time to consider the various items on the list, but this was not needed. 15 Only
H. E Mills, manager of the Mutual mine, postponed his decision
and said he was willing to discuss the situation after the NIRA
industrial codes for the bituminous coal industry were drawrt up;
these codes would regulqte both business and working conditionsJ 6
The other managers promptly gave-refusals on all points.
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On the same day that the, lists were circulated, forty miners at
Diamond Coal Company's Allison mine withdrew from the NMU
and applied for a charter with the United Mine Workers. Company officials encouraged this switch to the more conservative union
and urged their employees to join the UMWA, 17 The NMU
membership suspected that the Mine Workers were planning to
sabotage their organizing efforts by splitting the miners as they
had done in other parts of the country, and realized that a fight
between two rival unions was inevitable. Deadlocks in negotiations
over the NlRA coal codes, negative responses from employers
and UMWA presence in the area prompted the NMU miners
to call a strike. Workers formed locals at each of the mines. They
made plans to establish a relief fund and organized women and
children into separate union auxiliaries, involving the entire family
in the upcoming struggle.
On August 29, 1933, picket lines formed at the five major
coal mines in the Gallup vicinity. The union concentrated its
members at the Gallup American where more than two hundred
strikers demonstrated in front of the entrance. At the Defiance
mine, the only company not presented with a list of demands,
a local committee appeared early in the morning, gave the manager
the list, and when he refused to negotiate, set up picket signs. The
first day of the strike demonstrated the union's solidarity. They
succeeded in peacefully shutting down all the mines, and the
NMU's leadership proudly claimed a membership of 970 out of
approximately one thousand employees. 1s
Confident after their initial successes, the miners soon learned
that their struggle had just begun. Though the strike had only
been· in effect for one day and there had been no acts of violence,
Governor Arthur Seligman, a self-proclaimed friend of labor, on
the basis of reports he had received acted quickly. He declared
martiallaw for McKinley County and ordered National Guardsmen to entrain. 19
The local sheriff had been one of the first to telegraph the governor. He reported the situation as being beyond his control, insisting that without immediate assistance bloodshed and damage
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to. property would result. 20 Seligman authorized the sheriff to
deputize additional men, but he responded that the only solution
was to send in troops. Other individuals and groups who voiced
the need for martial law .were Gallup's mayor, prominent citizens,
mine owners and officials in the United Mine Workers, the Big
Four railroad brotherhoods, and the American Federation of Labor.
"I did everything possible- to avoid sending the troops," he wrote
to Senator Bronson Cutting's secretary, "but the appeals were so
insistent and so many prominent people from other parts of the
state, who I contacted, both Republicans and Democrats, believed
it best for me to act and act promptly. "21 .
Seligman ;ordered National Guardsmen from Albuquerque,
Clovis and Roswell toleave immediately, and placed approximately
250 troops under the command of General Osborne Wood. Wood
was once a miner himself and had been involved in labor disputes.
His past experience, Seligman believed, would soften the manner
in which martiallaw would be enforced. 22
U pan the guard's arrival at 12: 3° that night, they dispersed
nearly one hundred picketers in front of the Gallup American entrance. This was an unusually high number of strikers to be active
so late at night, but their presence had to do with problems encountered earlier in the evening: The miners, who were picketing
in. eight-hour shifts, had been due for relief but deputies had
barred their replacements. In response NMU members had later
assembled and, led by Martha Roberts and eighty singing women,
six hundred men marched "in defiance of armed guards" to relieve
the tired picketers.
While the miners' show of solidarity was able to intimidate
the sheriff's-deputies, it achieved little when matched against the
National Guard. The next, morning guardsmen dispersed five
hundred miners and· proceeded to union headquarters to enforce
a mass gathering ordinance, which required a permit for aU gatherings over five persons. 23 Since permits were handed out sparingly,
NMU meetings were held across the Arizona border under the
close scrutiny of the guard. At union headquarters members met
in groups of five, passing notes between rooms, and pickets were
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scattered down the roads leading to the mines with no more than
three or four men congregating together. 24
Though theNMU was able to maintain some semblance of
unity, the troops had weakened their position. Guardsmen had
been instructed to protect both mine' property and picketers as
long as they remained peaceful. The troops also saw fit to protect
strikebreakers, and willingly escorted them into the mines. 25 The
coalfields began to reopen as a result, and the first coal was pulled
out the day after the guard arrived. Gallup's unemployed and
nearby Indian reservations provided a large supply of laborers.
Under the guard's protection their manpower slowly replaced the
workers who had left their jobs. The Gamerco opened with eighty
men, forty-three of whom were underground workers. On the
following day the Diamond Coal Company operated with six
diggers and twenty-three company men. Normally 125 diggers
were employed. The other mines announced that they too would
open soon. 26
Letters of protest poured in from across the country to the governor's office, accusing him of deliberately breaking the strike. 27
The NMU urged him to retract his decision:
Despite your denial, it is very evident that the militia is being used
as a strike breaking institution and is giving direct and Material aid,
to the employers against the mine workers. The presence of the militia
has only resulted in the creation of tension and the choking of the
union from normally functioning. 28

The United Mine Workers did not remain idle through these
developments. John L. Lewis telegraphed the governor offering
assistance, suggesting that an alternative policy would be for mine
owners to make an agreement with the UMWA and "encourage
a union which is committed to the upholding of American institutions."29 Lewis sent Frank Hefferly into Gallup to see if he could
help. Hefferly had worked the mines in Gallup and was blacklisted
from them when he participated in a strike in the early 1900s. He
was also a strong Lewis man. 30 Following a directive from the national office, Hefferly ordered all UMWA miners back to work
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and offered membership to strikebreakers if they chose to join.31
As the tide turned against the walkout, additional supporters
arrived in Gallup. Pat Toohey, national executive board member
and founder of the NMU, took over active direction of the strike;
Accompanying him were Dick and Spike Allende~, brothers organizing for the union in the west, and George Kaplan, International Labor Defense representative. Soon to arrive from Hillsboro,
New Mexico, was American Civil Liberties Union attorney Edward D. Tittman. Both Tittman and Toohey soon after their
arrival praised the National Guard for showing "rare discretion
and judgment."32 However, these were the last compliments extended by either party.
The "unbiased" officers in the guard were less complimentary.
Second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Sage, had
this to say about the organizers:
.
The leading pair [the Robertses], claiming to be man and wife, are
experts in their line. They ought tobe. They admit that they have
spent years at their chosen profession. But they are not coal miners,
have never been and have no intention of ever working in a mine
of any kind. Two brothers [the Allenders] are aiso here. Neither has
ever worked in a mine of any kind. One claims to be a hod carrier,
the other admits he is a pool hall bum when not on strike duty; ...
And then there is one who claims to be a lawyer, and another, a
negro [James Walker, local miner], whose only claim to fame is that
several years ago his father was wounded during a strike riot. Because
of this fact he is supposed to know all about strikes and to be able to
predict their outcome.
Quite a motley crew, gathered together for the common and avowed
purpose of bilking an ignorant group of people out of all the cents,
and sense, they may posess [sic].
But, as different as these people are externally, they. are .exactly
alike internally-WITHOUT EXCEPTION ADMITTING THAT
THEY ARE· ACTIVE AND MILITANT COMMUNISTS"RED" COMMUNISTS-anti-government, anti-constituted .authority, anti-everything" And they tell you frankly that you can take it
or leave i t ! 3 3 ·
.
.
.
.

Activity accelerated following the .arrival of the newcomers.
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The miners conducted a house-to-house canvass asking strikebreakers to stay home and achieved minor successes. Picketing
again increased, and as a result, fewer men showed up to work 34
It was at this time of renewed confidence that Charles W. Grubbs,
regional officer for the NIRA, attempted to negotiate a settlement
over the dispute. He came at Seligman's request. 35 Grubb's first
impressions were optimistic, but negotiations between the NMU
and the operators proved more difficult than he had anticipated
since company officials stood firm in their refusal to discuss demands. Grubbs urged the miners to return to work and to let the
National Labor Relations Board arbitrate, but the strikers refused,
fearful that if they returned nothing would be done for them
and strike leaders would be fired. 36 He noted that the conflict
would continue as long as the troops remained since the mines
were able to secure enough help to meet their immediate needs. 37
Other government officials also recommended that the men call
off the walkout and wait for the NIRA industrial codes. Seligman,
at a September 4 meeting with strike leaders, had approved most
of the workers' major demands but prevailed upon them to wait
before taking further action. 3s Benito RodrIguez, from the Mexican Consulate, was sent to investigate the conditions of Mexican
nationals, approximately four hundred of whom were involved
in the strike. From these men he heard charges of discrimination
in assigning jobs and work areas, but RodrIguez was only able to
suggest that they go back to work. 39
On September 12 the Gallup American Coal Company entered
into an arrangement with the United Mine Workers. At the
Gamerco mine, where 175 strikebreakers had joined that union,
manager Horace Moses agreed to recognize their grievance committee and checkweighman. The men asked neither for union
recognition nor did they present a list of demands concerning
working conditions. A few days later Diamond Coal followed
Moses's lead and settled upon a similar agreement. 40 In strike
bulletins the NMU strongly attacked these agreements, damning
the United Mine Workers as labor fakers, union busters, and
company agents used to divide the miners' ranks. 41
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The strikers' position had been eroding slowly over the first
two weeks when on September 15 five strike leaders were arrested
by the sheriff on charges of vagrancy. Those arrested were the
Robertses, Harry Mavrogenis, Alejandro Alvarado and E. H. Navarro, three local NMU leaders. This harassment prompted a
demonstration of nearly one hundred school children who left
school and stormed down the street chanting, "We want Martha
[Roberts]." A group of women also marched to city hall demanding the release of the leaders. Both demonstrations were quickly
dispersed by the National Guard. 42
The arrests occurred at the same time an agreement between
the NMU and the Mutual mine had been reached. The NMU
local accepted a compromise position and agreed to return to work.
But the miners would not go back to work while fellow members
were in jail. Mine officials reacted to this as a breach of the agreement, and issued a statement that they would begin to hire new
men to fill the vacancies. 43 The Southwestern mine remained the
only one that had not decided to hire replacements.
The strike leaders were released from jail on September 18,
the same day that the long-awaited NIRA codes for the bituminous coal industry were completed. Many of the demands made
by the NMU were embodied in these codes, which. promised to
, ease later negotiations. 44 Upon their release the five NMU leaders
once again prepared to strengthen the strike. On September 22,
the largest group of miners and their families were out picketing
since the strike began. At the Gamerco mine over four hundred
strikers were in front of the entrance gate. It was here that the
first real flareup of violence occurred. William Reese, local miner
and UMWA organizer, with three others ina car on its way to
the mine, sprayed a "dark fluid" from a hand extinguisher in the
faces of the picketers, Guardsmen held the crowd back, letting
the car get away. Six persons were taken to the hospital, and
twenty-six others were treated for minor injuries.' Charges against
Reese were dropped because, according to General Wood, a rock
had first been thrown through the windshield of the car. 45 Only
Reese was called in to give his version of the incident, and the
>
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NMUwanted to know why he wasn't arrested for inciting a riot,46
They never received the answer to their question.
The NMU's first victory took place on September 23. A settlement was made with the Southwestern mine. The terms were a
compromise; though B. B. Hanger, the operator, refused to recognize the union, he did accept the workers'grievance committee
and checkweighman, and the reinstatement of all strikers. 41 Miners
had debated the value of settling with one mine at a time since the
walkout began, but as the general conditions of the strike worsened,
this idea won greater support. They felt that if they could get at
least a foothold in the mines their position would be strengthened. 48
The agreement was made on the same day that Governor Seligman died of a heart attack in Albuquerque. 49 This did not alter
the status of the National Guard; his successor, Andrew W. Hockenhull, maintained martial law in the area.
The second month of the strike showed an increase in tensions;
the mines that were operating with strikebreakers had approximately 50 percent of their needed work force. Mine owners were
intimidating aliens with threats of deportation if they did not
return to their jobs, and outbreaks of violence occurred on a regular basis. The NMU complained to Hockenhull of the guard's
abuse toward strikers and their families. They accused the troops
of insulting their wives, bullying their children and denying
permits for benefit functions. 50
But harassment continued; on October 5, seven strike leaders
were arrested on charges of inciting others to violate martial law
and to arm themselves. Those arrested were Robert Roberts, George
Kaplan, attorney Clarence Lynch, a member of the International
Labor Defense who had recently arrived, and four local NMU
leaders. The men were placed on a bread and water diet for refusing to do the yard work expected of military prisoners. 51 The
state's attorney general suggested to Hockenhull that he pardon
the men in order to ease the tensions in Gallup, but no action
was taken by him at this time. 52 The defendants were tried separately by a military court. Roberts and Kaplan were both found
guilty on the contradictory testimony of two guardsmen and were
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given the maximum sentence of six months at hard labor. The
others were released. 53
Even though the two men were in jail, miners entered into
negotiations with Diamond's Allison mine. By October 23, an
agreement similar to that made at the Southwestern mine was
settled upon,. and they began to return to work. Two mine
companies had now made lasting agreements with the NMU.54
Troop reductions were ordered as a result of the Allison agreement as well as political pressure from around the state. The National Guard had created a heavy burden on the state's budget.
Hockenhull sought financial assistance from the federal government,55 but though aid never came, the troops were not recalled.
Mine owners threatened to close down their operations if he
cancelled martial law; this would have had serious economic consequences. The Santa Fe railroad had for a time been contemplating replacing their coal-fueled engines with oil burners. If· the
Gallup supply ceased, there was little doubt the railroad would
make the change, thus affecting the state's entire coal· industry.
Also, the Gallup American was two-thirds owned by Nevada Consolidated, which operated the Chino copper mine near Silver City
and a smelter at Hurley, New Mexico. The company announced
that it would close all properties if the guard were removed. 56
Although it was doubtful that such threats would have been
carried out, Hockenhull decided not to take any chances and instead attempted to arbitrate the strike. He sent William A. Keleher
and ex-governor Merritt C. Mechem to investigate. conditions in
Gallup. The two arrived at the beginning of November and held
hearings with the three groups involved, the NMU, the UMWA
and the mine operators. The testimonies were nothing more than:
a recapitulation of unsolved differences of opinion, which had existed for many years. NMU representatives reiterated their longstanding grievances with the companies, accused public officials
of abusing their offices and pointed to section 7a of the NIRA to
justify their position: The committee representing the UMWA
was made up of individuals holding superior positions in the mines.
They defended their right to be currently working and favored
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maintaining troops in the area. In talking with mine operators it
was learned that only fifty or so openings were left for the 350
miners still on strike. Union recognition still was strongly opposed
by all of them.
The operators shared the opinion that the UMWA was the
better of the two organizations. Defiance manager George Miksch
told the two investigators:
The United Mine Workers are a better class of people than the National Miners Union. The National Miners Union consists of I
would say probably 80% Mexicans, probably 80% of those are not
citizens of the United States. Therefore the United Mine Workers
is a more intelligent race of people, but as far as recognizing the
United Mine Workers I can't say what the other miners would do
about that, but I never recognize any union myself. 57

Though their reasons might not have been based on such racist
attitudes, the other company representatives did hold a higher
opinion for the UMWA. It was apparent that the operators would
accept local committees and loose organizations, but not a strong
union. Their proposed solution for resolving the conflict was to
keep troops in Gallup and to place agitators in jail. There was,
however, a minor concession made by these men. If and when
the strike ended, they said they would rehire more workers than
they needed to ease the situation.
The governor's hopes of obtaining a quick settlement through
these hearings were soon blocked by a series of additional arrests,
which created new obstacles. On November 4, Martha Roberts
led .a demonstration of three hundred strikers and their families
to the county jail in protest of the imprisonment of the two strike
leaders. A fight between the National Guard and the protesters
broke out, resulting in injuries on both sides. 58 Martha Roberts
and eleven others were placed in jail, only four of whom were
later released. One week later five more strike leaders were arrested
and held on charges of violating martiallaw. 59
Hockenhull repeatedly had requested aid from the National
Labor Relations Board, which finally sent John Moore to arbitrate
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the situation. When Moore arrived the strike was approaching its
third month and miners. were weary and in the mood to compromise. Mine owners were also willing to bargain; with winter approaching, the mines were anticipating increased sales in heating
coal, and sought an end to the conflict. Within a week Moore had
finished his investigation and began negotiations.
By November 22, an eight point agreement had been reached
with all parties concerned. The NlRA codes covered many of the
original demands. The other points agreed upon included immediate employment of one hundred strikers, with the remaining
individuals to be placed on a preference hiring list, a promise of
no discriminatory action against those who walked out,. an elected
grievance committee and checkweighman, and the testing of all
mine scales. For those miners left without work, Hockenhull was
making arrangements to give them preference in federal and state
work projects. 60
The only remaining obstacle was the jailed leaders. Moore was
in favor of their release, but felt it was up to the governor to make
that decision. Hockenhull agreed on the condition that they sign
a promise to leave the state for one year. All but six signed, and
the status of the strike remained uncertain. The miners were willing to accept the terms negotiated by Moore, but would not return
to workunless the remaining six were freed. 61 Finally all were released, after giving verbal promises that they would leave. On
November 27 the strike ended.
At requests from the operators and town officials, who still feared
outbursts of violence, the National Guard was not removed en
masse. By December 18, all troops had been gradually sent home
with the exception of three enlisted men and two officers. 62 Martial
law remained in effect through January.
The end of the strike brought a brief period of peace to Gallup.
However, as a result of the compromise settlement, many of the
same grievances made at the outset of the walkout were still being
heard two months after the miners returned to work. Company
stores still· overcharged employees, and workers were paid in company scrip in violation of the NlRA codes. Housing conditions
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in the mining camps revealed negligence on the part of the owners.
Wage deductions ran so high that workers remained in constant
debt to some companies. There were continued charges of discrimination. Where NMU and UMWA membership coexisted,
both grievance committees were recognized making grievance procedures ineffective. Also, Governor Hockenhull's promise of employment to miners was never fulfilled to the degree it was intended
or needed. 63
Tensions remained high in the Gallup area over the next year.
In the early spring of 1935 the Gamerco mine sold a tract of land
on which employees lived, and a new outbreak of militancy developed, this time resulting in the deaths of the sheriff and two
miners. Gallup was once again in the headlines as national attention was drawn to the murder case of the ten accused. The NMU
disappeared from the labor movement when the Communist party
once again reversed its policy and disbanded its dual unions. Its
members joined the UMWA and established it as the dominant
union in the Gallup mines. Once unified the miners were able to
gain the union recognition that had eluded them in 1933.
Prompted by new legal sanctions, workers in Gallup rose up
to claim their right to form a union of their own choosing. Though
the NMU clearly represented a great majority of the miners they
soon discovered the NIRA's unenforceable nature, and encountered the combined forces of the companies and the state. Rather
than create an atmosphere for unions to cooperate in, the act intensified factionalism as unions competed and undermined each
other's organizing drives to gain the elusive recognition promised
by law.
As in most strikes in American history, accusations of radical
subversion and foreign influence were used to justify official state
action and rally public opinion against the union. The facts that
the NMU was a Communist party affiliate and that there were so
many aliens involved reinforced this argument. Workers chose a
union that they felt would most actively work for their benefit,
not necessarily for its politics. As seen in the list of demands, the
miners asked for only moderate changes which they felt were
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justified. However, the NMU's political ideology had its effect.
In years following the strike communist affiliated organizations
such as unemployed councils and an International Labor Defense
chapter remained relatively influential in the community.
A revitalized labor movement emerged in the 1930S, touching
off strike activity throughout the country. Workers participated
in over 10,000 strikes from May 1933 to July 1938 involving
more than 5,600,000 membersoftheir ranks. 64 In the coal mines
alone over 17°,000 men struck in 1933.65 Rather than being
unique the Gallup strike was highly representative of this period.
The involvement of radicals, management's disregard of workers'
legal rights, competition between unions, local governmental repression and federal mediation, all which characterized the era,
were also prevalent in Gallup.
.
The events in the eastern mining districts of the United States
overshadowed Gallup in magnitude and militancy. The San Francisco general strike and the Flint sit-down strike were more signifi~
cant in their attempts to bring new tactics and radical alternatives
into labor's campaign for justice. However, the Gallup strike indicates that New Mexico was incorporated into this struggle, and
rather than being an isolated section of the country was part of
the turmoil of the 1930S.
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